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Atemporal and intertemporal use of public lands, the determination of optimal levels of
wilderness designation and habitat preservation, and the appropriate regulation of natural
resources have all been “hot button” issues in the American West for quite some time now.  In
this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda which promises to yield interesting and
useful new policy insights into these fractious resource issues. 
JEL Classification:  B41, Q20, Q25
Key words:  land use, wilderness, regulation, research, agendaIn the rest of this paper, I shall use the terms management and regulation interchangeably. 
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AN AGENDA FOR THE STUDY OF LAND USE, WILDERNESS
DESIGNATION, AND RESOURCE REGULATION IN THE
AMERICAN WEST
1.  Introduction
The systematic use of natural resources has been a part of life in the American West for
well over two hundred years.  Grazing, mining, and ranching have all been an important part of
the economies of the various states in this area.  Not surprisingly, with use has come federal and
state involvement; this involvement has primarily been regulatory  in nature.  While many of the
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policy issues surrounding natural resource use have not changed much in the last two hundred
years (Clawson, 1983, p. 2), the nature of the regulatory relationship between the regulating party
and the regulated party has changed considerably over time.  Increased public expertise of
resource management issues, dissatisfaction with governmental resource management policies,
and new attitudes toward conservation and exploitation have all combined to dramatically alter
the character of this regulatory relationship (Cawley, 1993). 
In the American West, the most visible manifestation of this altered relationship has been
conflict.  There is conflict over federal jurisdiction over and management of public lands (Price,
1982), there is conflict over the extent of wilderness designation and habitat preservation (White,
1994), there is conflict over the desirability of saving endangered species (Mortensen, 1994), and
there is conflict over the need for multiple-use management of public forestlands (Blumm, 1994).
While this fractious environment has generated considerably more heat than light, the same
environment has provided a number of interesting economic research questions. 2
First, what can economic theory tell us about optimal patterns of land use over time.
Specifically, what are the impacts of , potentially, irreversible development on public lands, and
how is the pattern of land use altered by the land manager’s acquisition of new information about
particular aspects of land management? 
Second, what is an appropriate mechanism for addressing debates about wilderness
designation and habitat preservation?  Furthermore, once such a mechanism has been identified,
what does this mechanism tell us about equilibrium behavior by the various participants in such
debates?  Will such participants agree to contractually specifiable levels of wilderness
designation/habitat preservation in an inherently noncooperative environment?  If such
agreements can be designed, what are their properties?  On the other hand, if such agreements
cannot be designed, what are some of the key stumbling blocks? 
Third, given the present level of dissatisfaction with existing federal and state regulatory
arrangements, how can one design better natural resource regulatory regimes?  For instance,
should federal and state regulatory regimes serve parallel or hierarchical regulatory roles?
Furthermore, how do asymmetrically held information, bargaining power, and difficulties
associated with the monitoring and enforcement of federal and state laws impinge on regulatory
activity? 
The purpose of this paper is to:  (1) discuss these three questions, (2) propose a theoretical
research agenda for studying the various issues raised by these questions, and (3) show how
specific aspects and objectives of such a research agenda might be accomplished.  Wilderness
management problems in the Wasatch Mountain range (White, 1994; also see Pope and Jones,
1990), habitat preservation issues in the Virgin River (Gregory and Deacon, 1994), and the3
“sagebrush rebellion” (Cawley, 1993) remind us that a thorough understanding of the issues
raised by these three questions is vital to the optimal, and presumably less fractious, use and
management of natural resources in the American West. 
2.  Three Resource Issues in the American West
As discussed in the previous section, three principal resource issues in the American West
concern:  (1) land use over time, in the face of potential ireversibilities and new information
acquisition by land managers; (2) mechanisms for appropriately addressing questions of
wilderness designation/habitat preservation; and (3) the design of appropriate natural resource
management institutions. 
New analyses of the first issue are needed to shed light on what Marion Clawson (1983,
p. 2) has called the “. . . major policy issues . . .” in federal land management.  Specific issues that
deserve further research attention include the extent and nature of development on federal lands,
the terms on which federal land should be made available to various interested parties, and the
implications of alternate intertemporal land use policies. 
The wilderness designation and habitat preservation issues have typically been viewed in
black and white terms in the past.  On the one hand, there are those who have “. . . used
wilderness as the unifying theme for a new conservation agenda . . .” (Cawley, 1993, p. 43),
whereas on the other hand, there are those who have viewed wilderness as an “. . . all-purpose
tool for stopping economic activity” (Tucker, 1982, p. 131).  As a result, a considerable amount
of research is needed to study wilderness designation/habitat preservation issues
comprehensively.  Of particular relevance are game and bargaining theoretic approaches to4
This parallel versus hierarchical distinction is useful not only from the perspective of regulatory
2
agencies, but from the point of view of interest groups as well.  Hierarchical governing structures have been used
by western stock growers to promote their interests.  See Cawley (1993, p. 22) for more details. 
wilderness issues.  A key goal of this research should be to characterize and study the properties
of equilibrium strategies pursued by the various relevant players. 
The third main issue that I wish to focus on concerns the design of optimal resource
management institutions.  In the west, the “. . . relationship . . . between the federal, state, and
local governments in the management of [natural resources] . . .” (Clawson, 1983, p. 3), has been
a matter of continuing interest.  As such, research in this area is needed to facilitate better
understanding of the complexities of decision making between the various governmental entities,
particularly the efficacy of parallel versus hierarchical organizational structures.  
2
The methods and techniques of game and stochastic control theory can be used to
formally model and thereby rigorously study the three questions discussed above.  The
application of such methods and techniques to study these questions is still in its infancy.  As
such, research which uses these methods will attain at least two objectives and thereby contribute
substantially to the natural resource economics literature.  First, the results of this research can
be used to better understand the complex and fractious use and management issues relating to
public lands, wilderness designation/habitat preservation, and alternate regulatory regimes.
Clearly, such comprehension is the basis for providing constructive policy guidance about how
we might go about remedying and improving current resource use and management practices in
the American West. 
Second, the general methods and the research results can be used to better understand
natural resource use and management issues in developing countries.  Because sustainable5
For more on this, see Batabyal (1995a), Lele (1991), and Pezzey (1989). 
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development policies are so much a function of sustainable natural resource use policies,  it is
3
important to apply and when necessary modify insights gleaned from a systematic study of
resource use and management issues in the United States.  The successful pursuit of this research
agenda will enable us to apply insights to similar use and management issues in different
developing nations. 
Clearly, these objectives are central to the optimal use and management of natural
resources in the American West.  Given the increased national concern about sustainable use of
the West’s natural resources and the legislative battles over the appropriate use of such resources,
it is now more important than ever before to understand and manage the west’s natural resources
effectively.  Such action will ensure that an important part of the regional economy continues to
remain healthy in the near and distant future. 
3.  Previous Research and This Agenda
3a.  Use of Public Lands
In the American West, the central question in the management of public lands concerns
the appropriate use of such land at a point in time and particularly over time.  Although the
question of whether a particular type of land use is appropriate or not is, to some extent, in the
eyes of the beholder.  At a very basic level, this notion of appropriateness can be thought of as
one involving development or preservation of land (Cawley, 1993, p. 13).  Previous research has
focussed on this kind of develop/preserve question in a very simple framework.  Arrow and
Fisher (1974), and Henry (1974) have shown us that when land development is both indivisible6
and irreversible, a land manager who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about
the consequences of such development will invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation
and, hence, skew the binary choice development decision in favor of development. 
This simple and powerful result has been shown to hold in its most general form in a
two-period setting.  However, this result typically does not hold in more general settings.  As a
result, a number of interesting research questions arise which have not been adequately dealt with
in the literature.  First, how should land be used when the development decision is not all or
nothing, but in fact, divisible?  Work by Epstein (1980) and Hanemann (1989) suggests that this
bias toward development will arise in very limited circumstances.  However, further research is
needed to characterize the set of circumstances in which a development, or for that matter a
preservation, bias will arise.  Second, what is an appropriate management objective when the
manager’s time horizon involves many periods, and is possibly infinite?  Third, in a stochastic
setting with many time periods, the appropriate development question is “When do I develop?”
and not “Should I develop today or tomorrow?”  Answers to this “When do I develop?” question
await further research.  Fourth, as Anas (1988) has noted, very few researchers have studied
efficient long-run land use when there are multiple recreational uses, multiple consumer groups,
and the underlying economy is a multiregional one. 
It is not difficult to see that these kinds of issues are of great relevance to the American
West.  Further, these are all questions that have received scant attention in the literature, in part
because of the difficulties of incorporating dynamics and uncertainty in the same modeling
framework.  As such, a satisfactory resolution of these questions is a key component of my
suggested research agenda. 7
For more on this, see Callicott (1994). 
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3b.  Wilderness Designation and Habitat Preservation
Although wilderness designation and habitat preservation have been “hot button” issues
for quite some time now,  formal analyses of the strategic interaction between the various players
4
in a noncooperative setting have been few and far between.  While there has been progress in the
design of wilderness education programs (Thorn, Blahna, and Johnston, 1994), and in
understanding the role of capacity constraints in the management of public parks (Harrington,
1988), our knowledge of the strategic aspects of wilderness designation and habitat preservation
remains sparse.  More specifically, despite the obvious relevance of game theory to the
underlying issues, there have been virtually no game theoretic studies of mechanisms within
which the question of wilderness designation/habitat preservation may be studied.  As a result,
we know very little about:  (1) the design of agreements/contracts between the various “warring”
parties, (2) equilibrium behavior by the different parties in alternate game mechanisms, and
(3) optimal levels of wilderness designation in inherently noncooperative environments. 
Given this situation, it is easy to see that in order to understand these and other contractual
issues as they impinge on wilderness designation and habitat preservation, it is necessary to
construct and analyze appropriate game theoretic models.  Johnson and Watts (1989, p. 95) have
correctly noted that “. . . contractual stipulations are important to understanding behavior.”
Indeed, a central premise of this agenda is that in addition to understanding behavior, studies of
contractual relations can be an effective basis for concrete and useful policy guidelines.  8
See Cawley (1993), Clawson (1983), and Culhane (1981) for more details. 
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3c.  Design of Regulatory Institutions
Widespread dissatisfaction with current federal and state regimes for natural resource
management  has led to questions about the design of alternate and, presumably, more efficient
5
resource regulatory institutions.  There are two key issues here.  The first concerns problems such
as interjurisdictional conflict arising from the fact that there often are multiple regulators
operating at different levels.  The second concerns the fact that, in addition to the usual agency
problems, regulatory interactions in the American West are typically characterized by the
regulated parties possessing some degree of bargaining power. 
Neither of these two issues have received much research attention in the context of natural
resources.  Consider the issue of multiple regulation first.  Here, van Egteren (1992) has made
a promising beginning.  In a multiple principal model, he has shown that certain regulatory
decisions can have perverse effects on the behavior of the regulated parties.  Further, the small
literature on common agency—see Baron (1985), Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and Gal-Or
(1989)—has shown us that multiple regulation can significantly affect the kinds of regulatory
institutions that may be designed.  However, more research is needed to fully understand:
(1) methods for resolving interjurisdictional conflict, (2) the effects of alternate regulatory
requirements on the behavior of the regulated parties, and (3) the impact of one party bargaining
power on the design of desirable regulatory institutions. 
I now discuss research methods and procedures which provide a framework within which
the above described questions and issues can be analyzed. 9
See Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1987), and Hanemann (1989). 
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4.  Proposed Research Methods and Procedures
The theory of games and the theory of stochastic control, as presented in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and in Dixit and Pindyck (1993), respectively, have both advanced to a point where
it is now possible to comprehensively model, analyze, and understand the issues that I have
discussed in section 3.  Optimal land-use questions can usefully be analyzed as questions in the
theory of stochastic control; issues pertaining to wilderness designation/habitat preservation and
the design of alternate resource regulatory institutions are better modeled and understood as
problems in the theory of games. 
I now provide brief illustrative examples of the kinds of models that can be used to
understand the three main issues—land use, wilderness designation, and resource
regulation—that are the subject of this paper. 
4a.  Land-Use Modeling Issues
Consider an aspect of the optimal land-use question.  As discussed in section 3, resource
economists have, for the most part, analyzed the develop/preserve question in the context of a
two-period model.   In this kind of a setting, the appropriate development question is “Do I
6
develop land today or tomorrow?”  However, this framework is not very useful for analyzing
general land-use questions because any sensible analysis of such questions requires the







See Ross (1983) or Dixit and Pindyck (1993) for more on stopping time problems. 
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the relevant development question is “When do I develop land?”  This kind of question can be
meaningfully posed and analyzed as an optimal stopping time problem.  
7
For instance, suppose that a land manager receives information about the consequences
of developing land in accordance with a Poisson process   with a continuous,
nonincreasing intensity function    Information is acquired independently, and this
information has a cumulative distribution function   with finite mean.  By allowing the
information acquisition process to follow a nonhomogeneous Poisson process, I am leaving open
the possibility that it is more likely that information will be received at certain times than at
others.  Further, I assume that any information that is not used immediately in deciding whether
or not to develop land can be stored and used subsequently. 
Upon acquiring information, the land manager decides whether to develop his land or to
preserve it and wait for additional information.  Let   be the continuous and strictly monotone
function which maps information about development to revenue from development.  That is, if 
is the information acquired by time   then   denotes the revenue from developing, given
that a decision to develop land has been made.  Should the developer choose not to develop his
parcel of land, he incurs benefits and costs.  The benefits are the obvious Arrow-Fisher-Henry
type benefits; the land manager preserves the flexibility to acquire new information in the future.
The costs arise from the fact that the manager has to pay to obtain information; further, he loses
revenue from development.  This provides the essentials of a model—more specifically, a
two-action Markov decision model—within which the “When do I develop land” question can
be answered.  The model is completely determined once a suitable stopping (developing) rule has11
For more on the ILASR and other stopping rules, see Ross (1970). 
8
Batabyal and Yoo (1994) call this type of uncertainty “policy uncertainty.” 
9
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Gibbons (1992) for more details. 
10
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for more details. 
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been specified.  One such stopping (developing) rule is the infinitesimal look ahead stopping rule
(ILASR).   The ILASR can be thought of as a policy which stops a stochastic—“revenue from
8
development”—process precisely in those states for which developing land immediately yields
a higher payoff than waiting an additional amount of time.  For my purpose, the ILASR provides
the land manager with a rule by which to determine when land should be developed or preserved.
As such, this and other kinds of stopping rules can provide a basis for this aspect of optimal land
use policy in the American West. 
4b. Wilderness Designation Modeling Issues
Next, consider the wilderness designation/habitat preservation issue.  Four aspects of the
problem are important.  First, the relevant players in this “game” have mutually opposed interests
and hence there is conflict.  Second, the players typically will act strategically.  Third, on the part
of all the players involved, there is uncertainty not only about the intentions of the other players
but also about the effects of a particular policy  on the area that is proposed to be designated as
9
wilderness.  Fourth, the interaction between the players is not one shot but ongoing.  These four
aspects tell us that wilderness designation/habitat preservation issues can usefully be modeled as
dynamic games of incomplete information,  or as principal/agent games  with a single principal
10 11
(the regulator) and at least two agents representing, for instance, environmental interests and













Myers and Majluf (1984), Barro (1986), and Dybvig and Zender (1991) has shown us, signaling
games can be a particularly appropriate vehicle for studying wilderness designation/habitat
preservation issues. 
Despite the fact that wilderness designation/habitat preservation issues are a fertile area
for the application of game theoretic methods of analysis, the application of these techniques to
wilderness issues is virtually nonexistent.  As such, there remains considerable scope for useful
policy oriented research in this area. 
To see how a wilderness issue might be modeled as a signaling game, consider the
following, somewhat stylized, two-period interaction between an appointed regulatory authority
(RA) with jurisdiction over publicly owned land and a western development agency (DA).  Let
the RA’s one period payoff be   where   is the RA’s utility function,   is
the actual percentage of land that is designated wilderness,   is the percentage of land that is
expected, by the development agency, to be designated wilderness, and   is the RA’s type.  I
assume that the RA can be one of two types, i.e., he can be strongly prodevelopment (a weak
environmentalist), or he can be weakly prodevelopment (a strong environmentalist).  Thus, 
(strongly prodevelopment), or   (weakly prodevelopment).  Further,   is private information
possessed by the RA.  The DA’s payoff is   where   is the DA’s utility function.
With no discounting, the total payoffs to the RA and the DA are simply the sum of the first and
second period payoffs. 
The timing of this two-period game of incomplete information is as follows.  First, nature
draws the RA’s type.  Let    Second, the DA forms its expectation of first-period







Fourth, the DA observes   but not  , and then it forms its expectation of second-period
wilderness designation, i.e.,    Fifth, the RA observes   and then he chooses    This is a
simple game framework within which important questions like the optimal tradeoff between
wilderness designation and development, the nature of dynamically consistent wilderness policy,
and equilibrium behavior by the relevant players can be studied. 
4c. Institutional Design Modeling Issues
Finally, consider the question of designing alternate natural resource regulatory
institutions.  The impetus for this question comes from, inter alia, the comments of authors such
as Dudley (1990), Lipske (1990), and Probst and Crow (1991).  These and other authors have all
questioned current natural resource management methods and have asked how alternate and
better management regimes might be constructed.  As discussed earlier, some of the key issues
concerning resource management involves appropriately modeling and understanding:
(1) interjurisdictional conflict between multiple regulators operating at different levels, and
(2) the role played by the bargaining power possessed by those whose behavior is sought to be
regulated.  More specifically, issues of interest in the study of optimal hierarchical regulation with
multiple regulators include:  (1) a study of the properties of parallel versus hierarchical regulatory
regimes, (2) a study of the properties of hierarchical regulatory regimes, and (3) an analysis of
the effects of multiple regulators and multiple agents.  To answer these and related questions, we
may draw on the literature on common agency (Baron, 1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1986;
Gal-Or, 1989), and the literature on the economics of hierarchies (Tirole, 1986; Demski and
Sappington, 1987; Kofman and Lawarree, 1993, Batabyal, 1995b). 14
Consider the question of optimal hierarchical regulation with multiple regulators and
multiple agents.  This question can be analyzed by synthesizing and extending the work of Baron
(1985), and Batabyal (1995b).  Baron (1985) has studied cooperative and noncooperative
regulation of a single agent (firm) possessing private information, by two principals (regulators),
i.e., a Public Utility Commission responsible for setting prices and an Environmental Protection
Agency responsible for controlling pollution.  Baron has analyzed the equilibria of games in
which the regulators behave in Cournot and in Stackelberg fashion.  Interestingly, he shows that
while one regulator prefers cooperative regulation, the other regulator does not necessarily prefer
cooperative regulation.  Batabyal (1995b) has analyzed the impact of correlated private
information in a three-tiered hierarchical model with a single principal, two intermediaries, and
two agents.  In this model, the two intermediaries and the two agents possess private information.
Batabyal (1995b) shows that when this private information is perfectly correlated, in terms of the
mechanism that can be implemented, the principal loses nothing from his inability to monitor the
actions of the agents or the intermediaries. 
As far as this institutional design question is concerned, research that will combine the
types of models discussed in the previous paragraph and extend them to allow for the possibility
of one party bargaining power is very much in need.  This kind of research will enable us to
acquire new insights into, inter alia, (1) the state/federal regulatory interface and its effects on
resource use and management in the American west, (2) the extent to which state and federal
cooperation on regulatory matters is feasible and desirable, and (3) the ways in which regulators
might best deal with constituent groups—such as developers and the livestock industry—with
bargaining power over the outcome of regulation. 15
See Batabyal (1995c). 
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5. Conclusion
Given the fractious nature of public policy debates about land use, wilderness designation,
and current resource regulatory regimes, there is great need for rigorous research on these
questions.  I believe that the research agenda described in this paper will enable us to obtain a
deep and thorough understanding of the many and varied intricacies of natural resource use in
the American West.  Further, because a key aim of this paper is to delineate a policy oriented
research agenda, I expect that the conduct of this kind of research will generate significant and
implementable policy guidelines.  Finally, as indicated in section 2, extension of previous
research,  and the suitable application and adaptation of the results of this research agenda will
12
enable us to better understand the pressing natural resource use and management problems in the
different developing countries of the world. 16
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